As I mentioned recently, the Russian military is to be modestly expanded by the beginning of next year. This, as some have projected, is not a general mobilisation to replace huge losses in manpower occasioned by the now six month old conflict in Ukraine (it does not go further back than that no matter the delusions of western authorities – and, through media programming, the easily impressed western public – that Russia has been fighting in Ukraine for 8 years). On the contrary, the limited Russian forces involved in the Donbass liberation project, have sustained minimal losses – especially after the first month when tactics changed to use a more careful approach to reach the same goals.
In passing, I should mention that the same care has not been exercised by the Ukrainian forces, who have been required to restrict the movement of all males, employing recruitment by general mobilisation several times and are now down to somewhere near the ‘old men and young boys’ level, having reportedly (themselves) lost up to 200,000 soldiers over the six month period.
The reasons for Russian military expansion are obvious when a more rational mindset than that employed by western planners and observers, is employed. A credible view is given by VZGLYAD reporters in the article below.
‘Why the army needed more soldiers’ – VZGLYAD
I am not going to comment on the content of that article. It seems to be quite clearly stated, other than not much being said about the in-situ and recently formed militias which have comprised a sizable component of the allied forces, engaged alongside Russian military, in the liberation of their own territory, but also that of their neighbouring regions which have also expressed the desire to be part of Russia. Such expressions to be formalised by referendum as soon as practicable.
A nation acquiring new lands by general popular consent, lands which were previously protected by local militias, which may even have been classed as their own military forces in some cases, cannot permit those armed contingents – what would, in the new circumstances, now be classified as ‘militants’ – to freely roam around, still performing the same tasks as earlier they did. If they still wish to serve their region and their new country in the same capacity, they must be incorporated into the armed forces (or similar civil elements) of that country. I suspect that some accommodation of this need has been included within the 137,000 new places of Russia’s expanded forces. It makes sense, doesn’t it?
Not only that, but, it is known (or at least stated) that quite a number of volunteer battalions have been organised by Russia from captured Ukrainian combat units, formed of soldiers willing to fight against their former nation. This, of course, gives credence and forethought to the policy of respectful treatment of prisoners of war – suitable PoWs, those untarnished by war crimes, at least.
Russia is well placed therefore, to fill out the expanded needs of its army, without recourse to conscript mobilisation, from these sources together with the fulfillment of specific needs mentioned in the referenced article. All paid for, I suspect, by the windfall receipts occasioned by the foolish, reverse-effect sanctions imposed by Russia’s ‘colleagues’ and ‘partners’.